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Non-technical Summary
Syndication is a joint realization of one project or one investment
by several capital providers. An important economic benefit from
syndication is the know-how transfer between partners. In particular,
if one financier has less expertise in a specific business area, he may
benefit from the skills and competencies of his partners. This dynamic
feature of syndication plays a crucial role in many areas of financial
markets. This is particularly true in segments that are in the early
stages of their development or that are in the process of expanding.
In these markets, young investors may benefit from the know-how and
expertise of their established counterparts.
This theoretical paper deals with an experienced financier’s decision
to syndicate with other experienced or inexperienced investors. The
simple two-period model considers two agency problems associated
with syndication – the risk of hold-up by the partner and the risk of
low effort of the partner.
At the beginning of each period, an investor’s decision to (i) syndicate
an investment in a project and (ii) to choose between partnering with
an experienced financier and an inexperienced financier to establish
the syndicate is modelled. The project can benefit from the knowledge
of an experienced financier. A syndicate of two experienced financiers
further enhances project profitability, while a syndicate containing
only one experienced financier and one inexperienced financier does
not push project returns above what would have been available if only
the experienced financier participated in the project financing. An
inexperienced financier however can acquire skills if he participates
in financing a project. This is relevant only in the first period as the
financier can profit from the newly acquired skills in the second period.
In each period, the syndicate partner has the ability to steal the project
before the project return is realized. Experienced partners lose their
good reputations if they steal projects. Even for market entrants fraud
is costly because they lose the chance to gain reputation and know-
how. If these reneging costs exceed the benefits of cheating, which
consist of a one-time gain, the reputation effect can compensate for the
potential partner’s lack of information. The core of the analysis is to
check whether reputational concerns in fact outweigh the temptation
to renege on a given contract. However, reputational concern only
matters in the first period because stealing in the second period only
results in a reputational loss at the end of the period, at which time
the model ends.
Within this context, sometimes the joint investment is impeded be-
cause the financier believes that his partner has either strong incen-
tives to renege on the contract or is not sufficiently motivated to exert
enough effort. Reputational concerns do not always prevent a non-
optimal outcome.
In the second period only experienced financiers will partner to form
syndicates. This follows because there is no benefit to an inexperi-
enced financier from acquiring skills in the second period. Further,
an experienced financier does not have any incentive to partner with
an inexperienced financier because the partnership does not improve
project profitability. In the first period though, for some parameter
values, an experienced financier will form a syndicate with an inexpe-
rienced financier and in some instances he will partner with an expe-
rienced financier.
Who chooses whom?
Syndication, skills and reputation
Tereza Tykvova´ 1
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
October 2005
Abstract: Syndication, which is a joint realization of one project/one
investment by several capital providers, is a long existing phenomenon
that plays a central role in many financial market segments. Within
this paper we develop a theoretical model focusing on the dynamic
aspect of syndication, namely the know-how transfer between syn-
dication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis
checks whether repeated relationships and, thus, reputational concerns
outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract.
Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first con-
sists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals.
The second focuses on who chooses whom. We show that experienced
financiers may partner with either other experienced investors (in or-
der to raise the success probability of a project) or with unskilled
investors (who can gain knowledge). We further demonstrate that
sometimes the syndication is impeded because the financier believes
that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract
(hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).
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1 Introduction
The joint realization of one project or one investment by several cap-
ital providers has a very long tradition in many segments of finan-
cial markets. In the underwriting business, for example, the origins
of syndication can be found in the 18th century. During this time,
so called loan contractors jointly guaranteed the sale of French and
British government debts (see Carosso, 1970). In addition, the coop-
eration among financial intermediaries dealing with equity offerings
has also existed for an extensive amount of time. As early as 1870,
a syndicated offering of Pennsylvania Railroad’s shares took place.
Syndicated equity offerings continued to happen during the end of
the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (see Galston, 1925).
The roots of loan syndication can be traced back to the 1960s (see
Rhodes, 2000). However, during the past few years, a radical expan-
sion of syndicated loans has been noticed worldwide (see e.g. Jones et
al. (2002), Dennis/Mullineaux (2000) or Armstrong (2003)). Last but
not least, deals are usually syndicated in private equity and venture
capital markets (see e.g. OECD, 1996).
In theoretical literature, risk diversification and risk sharing are of-
ten assumed to be the reasons why investors may syndicate (e.g.
Chowdhry/Nanda (1996) or Wilson (1968)). Moreover, information
sharing can be another motive for investors to syndicate a deal (Mil-
lon/Thakor, 1985). The willingness of another financier to partici-
pate in a promising company may also constitute the basis for a fi-
nancier’s decision to invest. Detrimental investment decisions may be
prevented by a bundling of experience of several capital providers (see
Sah/Stiglitz, 1986). For Biais/Perotti (2003), complementary infor-
mation held by different investors plays a decisive role in such deci-
sions. Casamatta/Haritchabalet (2003) model an economy, in which
different financiers receive different signals. The quality of a signal
depends on the know-how of the investor. They conclude that expe-
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rienced capital providers syndicate exclusively with other experienced
partners because they possess good assessment skills. However, most
skilled financiers rely on their own judgement and invest alone in order
to retain all of the revenue for themselves.
Several empirical investigations analyze the reasons for syndicating as
well. Brander et al. (2002) argue that syndication in the venture capi-
tal market leads to more management support for portfolio companies
than stand-alone investments. As a consequence, syndicated deals
generate larger returns. The same result is found by Cumming/Walz
(2004). Another reason for syndicating is proposed by Lakonishok et
al. (1991) who show that pension funds are often not involved in an
investment until its success is apparent. Even if, while pursuing this
strategy, they do not share extraordinary returns that were realized
by incumbent investors in the past, they benefit from the investee’s
popularity and use it for their own marketing purposes.
An important economic benefit from syndicating is the know-how
transfer between partners resulting from their ability to learn. In
particular, if one financier has less expertise in a specific business
area, he may benefit from the skills and competencies of his partner.
These dynamic features of syndication play a crucial role in many ar-
eas of financial markets. This is particularly true in segments that
are in the early stages of their development or that are in the process
of expanding. In these markets, young investors may benefit from
the know-how and expertise of their established counterparts. Thus,
know-how transfer is a decisive determinant for the further evolution
of such markets. Hereby, reputational aspects can mitigate potential
conflicts. From this point of view it is very surprising that the mech-
anisms of know-how diffusion and reputation building have not yet
been profoundly investigated in theoretical research. Therefore, this
paper aims to offer insight into these issues.
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In contrast to what is found in a static setting by Casamatta/Haritcha-
balet (2003), namely that skilled investors only partner with other ex-
perienced investors, heterogenous syndicates can also be found within
financial markets. We argue that one reason why experienced investors
syndicate with unskilled investors, who cannot push project returns
the same way experienced investors can, is the dynamic aspect of such
deals. Due to the know-how transfer between partners and reputation
building, inexperienced investors accept comparably worse conditions
with respect to their payoff. The central topic of our analysis is to
investigate under which circumstances investors syndicate their deals.
Is syndication always feasible? How does the structure of a syndicated
deal look with respect to investors’ know-how and their payoffs?
Apart from the benefits of syndicating, it also incurs costs. The fi-
nancier who syndicates his deal must share the profit with his part-
ner. Moreover, the asymmetry of information causes moral hazard
problems. When the effort of each investor is neither observable nor
verifiable, they may shirk. Among others, Alchian/Demsetz (1972) or
Holmstro¨m (1982) analyze this free-rider problem within a team. Fur-
thermore, hold-up problems may emerge. Biais/Perotti (2003) argue
that investors do not syndicate the most profitable deals because they
are afraid that their partner might steal the project idea and exploit
it on his own account.
Within this paper, we develop a theoretical model in which the temp-
tation of reneging on a contract is mitigated through a dynamic set-
ting. Similarly, Pichler/Wilhelm (2001) and Chowdhry/Nanda (1996)
look at the syndication of underwriters and the role that reputation
and repeated relationships play. In our model, opportunistic behavior
incurs costs because after reneging, the investor loses his reputation
and potential future profits. Even for market entrants fraud is costly
because they lose the chance to gain reputation and know-how. If
these reneging costs exceed the benefits of cheating, which consist
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of a one-time gain, the reputation effect can compensate for the po-
tential partner’s lack of information. The core of the analysis is to
check whether reputational concerns in fact outweigh the temptation
to renege on a given contract. We show that sometimes the joint
investment is impeded because the financier believes that his part-
ner has either strong incentives to renege on the contract or is not
sufficiently motivated to exert enough effort. Reputational concerns
do not always prevent a non-optimal outcome. In order to keep our
model simple and the number of its parameters within manageable
limits, we abstain from considering other costs, such as negotiation
and organizational costs of syndication, and only deal with agency
costs.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. Section 2 de-
scribes the setup of the model. The syndicate structures are explored
in section 3. Some comparative statics results are presented in section
4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an economic environment consisting of investors and of
projects that need external funding. The model has two periods and
each project lasts for one period. It may either be financed by a single
investor or by a syndicate of two. The investors differ in their skills and
reputation. In particular, the investor either has reputation (skills) or
not. The reputation is lost when the investor reneges on a contract
and steals the project from his partner. Investors are risk neutral and
share the interest rate r ² [0, 1] per period. Thus, there is a discount
factor of 11+r per period. Moreover, each project requires a monetary
investment of I > 0.
There are two types of risk neutral investors: E and N. A type E
investor is an experienced (skilled) investor with reputation. He has
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a good track record and he has not reneged on a contract in the past.
He may enhance the success probability of the investment if he exerts
high effort. A type N investor is an inexperienced (unskilled) financier
(a newcomer or an investor from another sector). He is unable to
raise the success probability of a project. He may gain know-how and
reputation by syndicating with an experienced investor.
Each project generates two possible outcomes, good (R > 0) or bad
(0). Their probabilities depend on the experience and the effort of
the investor(s). There are two levels of effort: low (0) and high (² >
0). The effort of type N has no impact on the project’s success.
Type E may increase the probability of a good outcome if his effort
is high. With the help of better information sharing, more intensive
management support and project monitoring, the joint investment
of two E s exerting high efforts further increases the probability of a
good outcome. In particular, a good outcome (R) is reached with the
probability pH (low effort), pH + ² (high effort of one E ) or pH + 2²
(high effort of two E s). Exerting high effort, however, creates costs of
c > 0 for the investor whereas exerting low effort is costless.
Project owners, who need external financing, look for high-quality
investors. They ask only renowned financiers for funding. Concretely,
in each period, one project is revealed to each type E whereas type
N lacks direct access to projects. Type N may only participate in a
deal when an experienced investor with a reputation shares his project
with him. (In this case they either can form a syndicate or type N
may steal the project of type E and finance it on his own.) The
decision whether to syndicate or not is made by investors who have
direct access to projects. Thus, each investor who obtains a project
(= type E ) may either ask another investor to form a syndicate with
him or, alternatively, invest alone in this particular project. If he
chooses to syndicate, he may then select the type of investor he wants
to syndicate with and offer him a contract. The potential partner
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(type E or N ) may accept or reject the offer or steal the project. So,
type E may be involved in “his own” project and, at the same time,
participate as a partner in a “foreign” project.
If type N is invited to join a syndicate, he gains know-how and rep-
utation when he accepts the offer and does not renege. As a result,
he becomes type E at the end of the period. The success probability
of the investment, however, is no higher than without syndicating be-
cause N cannot add any value to the project. Only type E who exerts
high effort increases the success probability of a project.
In a syndicate, moral hazard and hold-up problems can emerge due
to information asymmetry. On the one hand, the effort of those in-
volved is neither observable nor verifiable, and, thus, investors may be
inclined to shirk (moral hazard). In particular, experienced investors,
whose high effort contributes to the increased success probability of
a project, may have incentives to exert low effort when high effort
would be optimal. On the other hand, the syndication partner may
steal the project after it is presented to him and pursue it on his
own (hold-up). In contrast to the effort level exerted, which is unob-
servable, market participants know when an investor steals a project.
Hereby, the dynamic aspect of the model plays a decisive role for both
types of investors in mitigating the temptation to renege on a con-
tract: Firstly, if a renowned investor steals a project, he will lose his
reputation. Secondly, an investor without any reputation wants to
build up his credibility. If he reneges, he will miss the chance to gain
reputation.
The paper analyzes what is gained as a result of a good reputation.
It compares the amount of payoff different types of investors receive
depending on whether or not they have reneged on a contract. Type N
may acquire experience in a particular sector by investing with type
E. Furthermore, type N can gain reputation if he participates in a
project and does not renege on the initial contract with his partner. If
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type N gains know-how and reputation in the first period, he becomes
type E at the end of this period and, thus, is offered a project at the
beginning of the next period. Hence, the value of reputation in our
model is endogenized. Hereby, the discounted expected value of the
future potential profit, which results from the direct access to a project
during the second period, is compared to a one-time gain resulting
from cheating. If an investor reneges on a contract in one period, he
loses the possibility to gain a direct access to projects and is debarred
from the market.
The time structure of the actions in one period is provided in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Time Line – One Period
-
Each E receives
a project
Each E decides
for or against
syndication;
chooses a partner;
proposes a contract
The partner
then decides
whether to accept or
reject the contract
or steal the project
Effort levels
are chosen;
investment
is realized
The project is
finished, the output
is generated and divided
between partners;
potential gain/loss
of reputation;
potential gain of experience
The net value of the project for different effort levels of type E is as
follows:
Low effort : pHR− I . (1)
High effort of one E : (pH + ²)R− I − c ≥ 0 . (2)
High effort of two E s : (pH + 2²)R− I − 2c ≥ 0 . (3)
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We define parameters ϕ (marginal revenue from high effort) and λ:
ϕ : = ²R , (4)
λ : = (pH + ²)R− I . (5)
With ² > 0 and R > 0, we have ϕ > 0. Furthermore, (2) and c > 0
imply λ > 0. We assume that
c ≤ ϕ λ
ϕ+ λ
. (6)
This implies ϕ > c (and, thus, ϕ− c > 0) because λϕ+λ < 1.
After subtracting (1) from (2) and (2) from (3), respectively, we obtain
ϕ − c. Thus, (1) < (2) and (2) < (3). We can now establish the
following axiom.
Axiom 1 (Optimal syndication and effort with type E) The
high effort exerted by type E generates a higher net value than when
type E exerts low effort. The syndication of two Es exerting high efforts
generates a higher net value than if only one E exerts high effort.
Since effort costs are assumed to be “not very high” (condition (6)),
(joint) high effort increases the efficiency.
Moreover, we assume that the necessary monetary investment I is
sufficiently high.
I ≥ 1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− λ . (7)
The parameters and the structure of the model are known to all in-
vestors.
8
3 Syndicate Structures
In this section, which constitutes the central part of the paper, we
investigate under which circumstances syndication occurs, who the
syndicate partners are and how revenues and costs are divided between
them. We start the analysis with the second period and solve the
model backwards.
3.1 The Second Period
Since the second period is the final period, knowledge transfer and rep-
utational status at the end of this period do not play a role. Within
this framework, we analyze whether type E (who obtains a project)
decides to syndicate or not at the beginning of the second period.
He does not invest in the project with type N since this type of in-
vestor cannot improve the project’s profitability nor can he benefit
from acquiring skills and reputation. Therefore, the total amount of
net value achieved by syndicating with type N in the second period
is no higher than that from investing alone.2 Thus, the experienced
investor (also called the “original investor”) selects one of two alter-
natives. He chooses either to syndicate with another skilled investor
(who can contribute to the project’s success with his effort) or invest
in the project alone. If he decides to syndicate his project, which is
the optimal solution when both investors exert high efforts (see Axiom
1), the other investor (also called the “syndication partner”) partic-
ipates in the investment with a share of 1 − α. The tradeoff for the
original investor is that, on the one hand, he profits from the increased
expected revenue induced by the high effort of his syndication partner
2As we will show in section 3.2, syndication between type N and type E is only possible with
a nonlinear financing structure. Given this, the impossibility of syndicating with type N in the
second period could as well be clarified by the following rationale: Type N will not participate in
a syndicate because he cannot enjoy the benefit of the knowledge transfer as a compensation for
an “unfair” share policy.
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while, on the other hand, he has to share this output with his partner
in order to motivate him to participate, to exert high effort and to
avoid a hold-up.
The expected profit of the original investor who syndicates his deal
depends on his share α. His optimal α is given by
maxα α(λ+ ϕ)− c = maxα α (8)
s.t. PC2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ 0
IC2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ (1− α)λ
H2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ λ− c
PC1 : α(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ λ− c
IC1 : α(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ αλ
α ² 〈0, 1〉
PC/IC/H refer to the participation constraint and incentive con-
straints with respect to high effort and the avoidance of a hold-up.
Subscript “1” indicates the original investor and subscript “2” refers
to his syndication partner. The syndication partner participates in
the deal if he receives, at a minimum, his reservation utility, which
is normalized at 0 (PC2).
3 He is motivated to exert high effort if his
expected payoff is higher than if he exerts low effort (IC2). He will
not steal the project if his expected profit from the syndicated deal
exceeds that from stealing the venture and carrying it out on his own
(H2). The original investor syndicates when it is more profitable for
him than investing alone (PC1). He exerts high effort when it is more
profitable than exerting low effort (IC1). Additionally, each investor
3At this point, the profit received from the syndication partner’s “own project”, which is inde-
pendent of his role as a syndication partner, was subtracted from both sides of the inequality. PC2
is only concerned with the decision to invest in an additional project as a syndication partner.
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must obtain a non-negative share of the expected revenue, which is
stated in the last condition.4
When satisfied, PC1 and H2 imply
λ
λ+ϕ ≤ α ≤ ϕλ+ϕ . Since λ > 0 and
ϕ > 0, we have α ² 〈0, 1〉. In other words, both investors must receive
a non-negative fraction of output in order to participate (investor 1)
and not to hold-up (investor 2).
To ensure the syndication partner participates, a non-negative ex-
pected profit from the deal is sufficient enough for him (PC2). How-
ever, if the original investor wants his partner to work hard, a larger
payment is necessary (IC2). Thus, if the constraint IC2 is fulfilled,
then PC2 also holds. Formally, this result is derived from 1 − α ≥ 0
and λ > 0.
Moreover, pursuant to (6), IC2 results from H2 and IC1 from PC1,
respectively. From H2, we get (1 − α)ϕ ≥ αλ. Therefore, α ≤ ϕϕ+λ ,
which can be rewritten as 1 − α ≥ λϕ+λ . With (6), the inequality
λ
ϕ+λϕ − c ≥ 0 holds. IC2 can be rewritten as (1 − α)ϕ − c ≥ 0.
Furthermore, from H2, we get (1 − α)ϕ − c ≥ λϕ+λϕ − c ≥ 0. This
proves that IC2 holds. Similarly, IC1 results from PC1. Thus, in
maximization problem (8), only two constraints, H2 and PC1, remain.
If these two constraints are met, the other four constraints hold as well.
In order to maximize α, the hold-up constraint of the syndication
partner (H2) will be satisfied with equality. Hence,
α =
ϕ
ϕ+ λ
. (9)
The larger the amount of revenue expected from stealing the project
(λ), the more the syndication partner must be compensated. This
4For some investors, e.g. venture capitalists, control may be a decisive issue. In this case a
narrower constraint on α can be assumed. The original investor may want to keep a certain
minimum fraction, α̂, of the venture to guarantee his control (i.e. α ² 〈α̂, 1〉). Given this additional
restriction, syndication can be impeded if the original investor wishes to retain “too much” control.
In maximization problem (8), syndication would not take place if α̂ > ϕϕ+λ (see (9)). In order to
avoid further constraints and, thus, keep the model simple, we do not consider this issue.
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implies a lower share α for the original investor. Thus, α is decreasing
in λ. On the contrary, the larger the marginal revenue from the high
effort executed by the second investor (ϕ), the larger the joint output.
In this case, the syndication partner is satisfied with a lower fraction
of expected revenue. Thus, α is increasing in ϕ.
Substituting (9) into PC1 indicates that PC1 is met when ϕ ≥ λ.
If ϕ < λ and, thus, the original investor’s expected profit from the
high effort for a syndicated investment is lower than that for a non-
syndicated investment, the participation constraint of the original in-
vestor (PC1) is not satisfied. Therefore, he prefers investing alone.
Proposition 1 (Second period) If ϕ < λ, type E invests alone in
the second period and exerts high effort. His expected profit is λ − c.
If ϕ ≥ λ, he syndicates with another type E and obtains a fraction of
α = ϕϕ+λ. His expected profit is ϕ − c. In this case, both financiers
exert high effort.
The optimal outcome in the second period is a syndication of experi-
enced investors exerting high effort (see Axiom 1). However, it can be
shown that it is impossible to achieve this result if ϕ < λ; not even
with a nonlinear financing structure, where the fraction of the invest-
ment an investor bears and his share of the realized revenue differ.5
3.2 The First Period
The next section is devoted to the investigation of the first period.
Here, the investors’ behavior depends on what they expect to happen
in the second period. We begin analyzing the case when syndication
in the second period is not anticipated.
5A similar outcome holds for the first period, which is analyzed in section 3.2. Formal proofs
can be obtained from the author.
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3.2.1 No Syndication in the Second Period (ϕ < λ)
Firstly, we investigate the joint investment between two experienced
investors in the first period. Secondly, we look at syndication be-
tween an experienced original investor and an inexperienced syndi-
cation partner. In order to identify the most profitable strategy for
the original investor in the first period, we conclude by comparing
his profits from these two alternatives to those from a non-syndicated
investment.
An Experienced Syndication Partner in the First Period (ϕ <
λ)
If ϕ < λ and, thus, in the second period syndication is not expected,
in the first period the maximization problem of type E wanting to
syndicate his project with another type E is as follows:
maxα α(λ+ ϕ)− c = maxα α (10)
s.t. PC2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ 0
IC2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ (1− α)λ
H2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ λ− c− 1
1 + r
(λ− c)
PC1 : α(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ λ− c
IC1 : α(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ αλ
α ² 〈0, 1〉
The constraints of this optimization problem are the same as those
defined in (8). The only difference is the hold-up constraint of the
syndication partner (H2) because, in contrast to the final period, rep-
utational concerns play a role during the first period. If the syndica-
tion partner reneges on a contract, he loses his reputation and, thus,
the opportunity to realize a gain in the second period, which amounts
to λ− c (see Proposition 1) discounted by 11+r .
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With ϕ < λ the participation constraint of the original investor in the
second period does not hold (as shown in section 3.1). Therefore, the
original investor prefers investing alone in the second period. However,
in the first period the syndication partner faces a tougher hold-up con-
straint and, thus, compared to the second period, a smaller fraction
of the revenue prevents him from reneging on the contract. So, syndi-
cation may be preferred by the original investor. The reason for this
is, that if the syndication partner reneges in the first period, he loses
reputation and, hence, a profit in the second period. On the contrary,
hold-up in the second period has no negative future consequences for
the partner.
Lemma 1 (Type E in the 1st and alone in the 2nd) If syndica-
tion in the second period is not expected (ϕ < λ) and type E syn-
dicates with another type E in the first period, he retains a frac-
tion of α = min{ϕ+
1
1+r (λ−c)
λ+ϕ ,
ϕ−c
ϕ } and his expected profit reaches pi =
min{ϕ + 11+r(λ − c) − c, ϕ−cϕ (λ + ϕ) − c}. Both investors exert high
effort.
Lemma 2 (Choice of α if type E in the 1st, alone in the 2nd)
α =
ϕ+ 11+r (λ−c)
λ+ϕ if r >
cλ
ϕλ−c(ϕ+λ); α =
ϕ−c
ϕ if r ≤ cλϕλ−c(ϕ+λ).
See Appendix A for the proof.
An Inexperienced Syndication Partner in the First Period
(ϕ < λ)
Syndicating with type N does not increase the success probability
of a project. Therefore, if a nonlinear financing structure6 is not al-
lowed, syndication between an experienced and an inexperienced in-
6Under a linear structure, the syndication partner finances a fraction 1 − α of the investment
and obtains the same fraction of revenue.
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vestor does not take place. This is because the original investor cannot
be better off with type N than with a non-syndicated investment.
In the following we analyze whether syndication is possible under a
nonlinear financing structure where the share of the investment cost
type N bears is larger (1−α+β with β > 0) than his participation on
the realized returns (1− α). In this way, type E can be compensated
for letting type N participate in financing a project. The dynamic
aspect of our model plays a central role here. Since he gains both
reputation and experience, type N may be interested in syndicating
with type E in the first period, even if he realizes a loss. In the second
period, he profits both from the direct access to a project and the
know-how acquired in the first period, which leads to an increase in
the success probability of his investment.
Under the securities design described above, the maximization prob-
lem of type E wanting to syndicate with type N in the first period is
as follows:
maxα,β αλ− c+ βI (11)
s.t. PC2 : (1− α)λ− βI + 1
1 + r
(λ− c) ≥ 0
H2 : (1− α)λ− βI + 1
1 + r
(λ− c) ≥ λ− ϕ
PC1 : αλ− c+ βI ≥ λ− c
IC1 : αλ− c+ βI ≥ α(λ− ϕ) + βI
α ² 〈0, 1〉
α− β ² 〈0, 1〉
The participation and incentive constraints in (11) differ in many ways
from those in (8) and (10). There is no incentive constraint on the
effort executed by type N (IC2), since his effort is not value-enhancing.
Furthermore, type N overproportionally finances the investment I.
Thus, if he does not steal the project, his expected profit in the first
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period amounts to (1−α)λ−βI. Additionally, he gains experience and
reputation. As a consequence, he expects to receive λ−c in the second
period. This profit is discounted by the factor 11+r . His reservation
utility of 0 and his expected profit of λ− ϕ from stealing the project
(see (1)), determine the constraints PC2 and H2, respectively.
The participation constraint of the original investor (PC1) reflects the
trade off between sharing the revenue (syndication) and having larger
investment costs (investing alone). If the incentive constraint (IC1) is
fulfilled, he exerts high effort.
Both partners must receive a non-negative fraction of the output and
bear a non-negative fraction of the investment costs. These restrictions
are reflected in the last two constraints.
Lemma 3 (Type N in the 1st and alone in the 2nd) If syndi-
cation in the second period is not expected (ϕ < λ) and type E syn-
dicates with type N in the first period, he exerts high effort and his
expected profit reaches pi = ϕ+ 11+r(λ− c)− c.
See Appendix B for the proof.
The Decision in the First Period (ϕ < λ)
Now we will show that, when syndication in the second period is not
expected (ϕ < λ), type E never syndicates with another type E in
the first period. We will further demonstrate under which conditions
type E syndicates with type N and when he prefers investing alone.
We distinguish between two cases, which depend on whether PC1
from the maximization problem (11) holds (see Appendix B, constraint
(a)). In other words, we first analyze whether the original investor’s
expected profit from syndicating with an inexperienced partner (see
Lemma 3) is higher than his expected profit from investing alone.
Case 1 (PC1 satisfied): ϕ+
1
1+r(λ− c)− λ ≥ 0
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From satisfying PC1 immediately follows that syndication with type
N is no less profitable for the original investor than investing alone.
The expected profit of the original investor who partners with type
N in the first period amounts to ϕ + 11+r(λ − c) − c (see Lemma 3).
Due to relatively low marginal revenue from high effort exerted by
a second type E investor (ϕ < λ), this value is no lower than the
original investor’s maximum expected profit from his syndicated deal
with type E (see Lemma 1). Thus, syndicating with type N is no less
profitable for the original investor than syndicating with type E.
Proposition 2 (Decision in the 1st if alone in the 2nd (1 )) If
syndication in the second period is not expected (ϕ < λ) and at the
same time ϕ+ 11+r(λ− c)−λ ≥ 0, then type E will syndicate with type
N in the first period.
Case 2 (PC1 not satisfied): ϕ+
1
1+r(λ− c)− λ < 0
In this case, syndication with type N does not take place in the first
period because type E prefers investing alone. To put it differently, it
is impossible to find any combination of α and β that would induce
the original investor to syndicate with type N in the first period.
It remains to be seen whether syndicating with type E is better for
the original investor than investing alone. We distinguish between two
subcases (see Lemma 2):
Subcase 2.1: r > cλϕλ−c(ϕ+λ) and, thus, ϕ+
1
1+r(λ−c)−c < ϕ−cϕ (λ+
ϕ)− c
In the first period, syndication with type E does not happen because
investing alone is more profitable for type E since the participation
constraint PC1 in (10) is not satisfied. The left-hand side is equal to
ϕ+ 11+r(λ− c)− c, which is lower than the right-hand side λ− c (due
to the condition valid for Case 2).
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Subcase 2.2: r ≤ cλϕλ−c(ϕ+λ) and, thus, ϕ+ 11+r(λ−c)−c ≥ ϕ−cϕ (λ+
ϕ)− c
With this and the condition valid for Case 2, we have
ϕ− c
ϕ
(λ+ ϕ)− c ≤ ϕ+ 1
1 + r
(λ− c)− c < λ− c .
Therefore, investing alone generates a larger expected profit (λ − c)
than syndicating with type E (ϕ−cϕ (λ+ ϕ)− c).
In both subcases, the condition valid for Case 2 implies that the
marginal revenue from the “second” high effort is very low (not only is
ϕ < λ, but even ϕ < λ− 11+r(λ− c) also). As a consequence, investing
alone not only in the second period but in the first as well is more
profitable than syndicating with type E.
Proposition 3 (Decision in the 1st if alone in the 2nd (2 )) If
ϕ+ 11+r(λ− c)− λ < 0, type E invests alone in both periods.
3.2.2 Syndication in the Second Period (ϕ ≥ λ)
In this section we analyze the original investor’s decision in the first
period when syndication in the second period is expected. We proceed
analogously to 3.2.1. For this reason, we leave out detailed explana-
tions on the methodology and intuition. If necessary, the reader can
consult the preceding section.
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An Experienced Syndication Partner in the First Period (ϕ ≥
λ)
If ϕ ≥ λ and, thus, syndication is expected in the second period, the
maximization problem of type E wanting to syndicate his project with
another type E in the first period is as follows:
maxα α(λ+ ϕ)− c = maxα α (12)
s.t. PC2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ 0
IC2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ (1− α)λ
H2 : (1− α)(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ λ− c− 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c)
PC1 : α(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ λ− c
IC1 : α(λ+ ϕ)− c ≥ αλ
α ² 〈0, 1〉
Lemma 4 (Type E in both periods) If syndication in the second
period is expected (λ ≤ ϕ) and type E syndicates with another type E
in the first period, he retains a fraction of α = min{ϕ+
1
1+r (ϕ−c)
λ+ϕ ,
ϕ−c
ϕ }
and his expected profit reaches pi = min{2+r1+r(ϕ − c), ϕ−cϕ (λ + ϕ) − c}.
Both investors exert high effort.
Lemma 5 (Choice of α if type E in both periods)
If r ≤ ϕ2−ϕλ+cλϕλ−c(ϕ+λ) then α = ϕ−cϕ , otherwise α =
ϕ+ 11+r (ϕ−c)
λ+ϕ .
See Appendix C for the proof.
An Inexperienced Syndication Partner in the First Period
(ϕ ≥ λ)
Corresponding to the situation without syndication in the second pe-
riod (see (11)), a nonlinear financing structure must be used in order
to make the participation of type N possible. Type E has the following
maximization problem:
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maxα,β αλ− c+ βI (13)
s.t. PC2 : (1− α)λ− βI + 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) ≥ 0
H2 : (1− α)λ− βI + 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) ≥ λ− ϕ
PC1 : αλ− c+ βI ≥ λ− c
IC1 : αλ− c+ βI ≥ α(λ− ϕ) + βI
α ² 〈0, 1〉
α− β ² 〈0, 1〉
Lemma 6 (Type N in the 1st and type E in the 2nd) If syn-
dication in the second period is expected (λ ≤ ϕ) and type E syndicates
with type N in the first period, he exerts high effort and his expected
profit reaches pi = λ+ 11+r(ϕ− c)− c.
See Appendix D for the proof.
The Decision in the First Period (ϕ ≥ λ)
If syndication with type E in the second period is profitable, a joint
investment with him in the first period is no less profitable for the
original investor. The reason for this is, that the syndication partner
can be satisfied with the same or even a lower fraction of revenue in the
first period due to his tougher hold-up constraint. Thus, the original
investor would never invest alone. The lower the interest rate r, the
higher the utility of type N from syndication because the present value
of his future profit is higher. Therefore, we expect that for low values
of r, syndicating with type N may be preferred to syndicating with
type E in the first period.
Formally, by syndicating with type E, the original investor’s expected
profit indicated in Lemma 4 is generated. We distinguish between two
cases (see Lemma 5):
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Case 1: r > ϕ
2−ϕλ+cλ
ϕλ−c(ϕ+λ) (and, thus,
1
1+r <
λϕ−c(λ+ϕ)
ϕ2−cϕ )
The expected profit of type E from syndicating with another type E
amounts to 2+r1+r(ϕ−c), which is no less than the expected profit gained
from investing alone or from syndicating with type N.
Case 2: r ≤ ϕ2−ϕλ+cλϕλ−c(ϕ+λ) (and thus, 11+r ≥ λϕ−c(λ+ϕ)ϕ2−cϕ )
The expected profit of type E from syndicating with another type
E reaches (ϕ−c)(λ+ϕ)ϕ − c, which is no less than the expected profit
gained from investing alone. Whether type E or type N is chosen as
syndication partner depends on the value of r. If 11+r < 1 − cλϕ(ϕ−c) ,
syndicating with type E is more profitable and vice versa.
See Appendix E for the proof.
Proposition 4 (Syndication in the 1st if synd. in the 2nd)
If syndication in the second period is expected (λ ≤ ϕ), type E syndi-
cates in the first period as well. He never invests alone.
Proposition 5 (Structure in the 1st if synd. in the 2nd)
If syndication in the second period is expected (λ ≤ ϕ), then
1. if 11+r ²
[
0, λϕ−c(λ+ϕ)ϕ(ϕ−c)
)
, type E syndicates with another type E
and his expected profit is 2+r1+r(ϕ− c),
2. if 11+r ²
[
λϕ−c(λ+ϕ)
ϕ(ϕ−c) , 1− cλϕ(ϕ−c)
)
, type E syndicates with another
type E and his expected profit is (ϕ−c)(λ+ϕ)ϕ − c,
3. if 11+r ²
[
1− cλϕ(ϕ−c) , 1
]
, type E syndicates with type N and his
expected profit is λ− c+ 11+r(ϕ− c).
In the first period, more deals are syndicated than in the final period.
The reason is that the dynamic environment promotes syndication
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since it diminishes incentives for a hold-up. Furthermore, the trans-
fer of knowledge in the dynamic setting enables the participation of
inexperienced investors, which would be impossible in a static setting
and, thus, does not emerge in the second period. As expected, for
those values of the interest rate r that are under a certain level, syn-
dicating with type N is more profitable for the original investor than
syndicating with type E.
4 Comparative Statics
Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis with respect to the
syndicate structure (see propositions 1 to 5). Depending on the pa-
rameter constellations, we have four possible combinations of actions
in the first and in the second period. Type E may invest alone in both
periods. Alternatively, he can syndicate with another type E in both
periods. Furthermore, he may invest with type N in the first period
and with type E or alone in the second period.
Table 1: Syndication partner of type E
Conditions 1st period 2nd period
1
1+r <
λ−ϕ
λ−c alone alone
1. ϕ < λ
2. 11+r ≥ λ−ϕλ−c
syndication with N alone
1. ϕ ≥ λ
2. 11+r < 1− cλϕ(ϕ−c)
syndication with E syndication with E
1. ϕ ≥ λ
2. 11+r ≥ 1− cλϕ(ϕ−c)
syndication with N syndication with E
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Syndicating in the first period is more attractive than in the second
one because of learning and reputational concerns. In the following,
we discuss the impact of various parameters on syndication and its
structure.
Interest rate: A high interest rate r implies high discounting of fu-
ture revenues and, thereby, diminishes the value of reputation and
learning. Hence, in the first period, the participation of inexperi-
enced investors is hindered. The higher the discounting, the lower the
present value of their potential future returns. Thus, a high interest
rate motivates a hold-up and decreases the willingness of inexperi-
enced investors to overproportionally finance the investment in the
first period. Concretely, syndicating with type N does not take place
if r > ϕ−cλ−ϕ (for ϕ < λ) or if r >
cλ
ϕ(ϕ−c)−cλ (for ϕ ≥ λ).
Effort costs: High effort costs c impede syndication on general and
syndication with an experienced financier in particular. Type E in-
vests alone in the first period if c > ϕ + rϕ − rλ and ϕ < λ. When
ϕ ≥ λ, type E does not syndicate with another type E in the first
period if c ≥ ϕ2rϕr+λ+λr .
Revenue from high effort: High marginal revenue from high effort
(ϕ) facilitates syndication in both periods. If ϕ reaches a certain level
(λ), syndication in both periods takes place. If it remains below this
level, syndication does not happen in the second period. However, if
ϕ ≥ λ− 11+r(λ−c) syndication (with type N ) in the first period occurs.
Numerical example: Figure 2 depicts the four combinations of syn-
dicate structures and the impact the parameters ϕ and r have on them
(for a given level of λ = 0.3 and two different levels of effort costs c:
0.1 (Part A) and 0.01 (Part B)). For sufficiently large values of ϕ,
syndication among experienced investors in the second period takes
place. For sufficiently low values of r and, thus, high values of repu-
tation and learning, syndication with an inexperienced investor in the
first period occurs.
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Figure 2: A syndication partner of type E at different levels of ϕ, r
and c (λ given)
PART A (high c): λ = 0 .3 and c = 0 .1
j
1
1 + r
synd.E 2nd
synd.E 1st
al.2nd
al.1st
al.2nd
synd.N 1st
synd.E 2nd
synd.N 1st
j=Λ
PART B (low c): λ = 0 .3 and c = 0 .01
j
1
1 + r
synd.E 2nd
synd.E 1st
al.2nd
al.1st
al.2nd
synd.N 1st
j=Λ
Remarks: al.=alone, 1st=1st period, 2nd=2nd period, synd.=syndication, E=type E, N=type N
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In both left quadrants in each figure (no syndication in the second
period, i.e. ϕ < λ), for a given r, syndication with type N in the first
period occurs for “large values” of ϕ. The opposite is true in both
right quadrants (syndication in the second period, i.e. ϕ ≥ λ). The
reason is that the respective expected payoffs have different structures.
When ϕ < λ, a higher ϕ implies higher potential profits in the second
period for type N. Therefore, a higher interest rate is acceptable. As
a result, the line is decreasing in ϕ. In both right quadrants (ϕ ≥ λ),
the curve demarcating the two possible outcomes in the first period
has an opposite slope. The situation here is different from both of
the left quadrants because the original investor chooses between syn-
dicating with type N and syndicating with type E. A higher ϕ implies
higher profits in the second period for type N. But, a higher ϕ also
leads to higher profits from syndicating with type E in the present
period. Because the former effect occurs in the second period, it must
be discounted. Thus, if ϕ increases and other parameters remain un-
changed, the rise in the profitability of syndication is higher with type
E than with type N. If syndicating with type N should remain the
more profitable strategy, a decrease in the interest rate r is necessary.
Therefore, when ϕ ≥ λ, 11+r is increasing in ϕ.
5 Conclusion
Joint financing by several capital providers is quite common in many
financial market segments, such as loan provision, reinsurance, un-
derwriting of securities or venture capital and private equity financ-
ing. We observe very different syndicate structures with respect to
the experience of syndicate members. In this paper, we have mod-
elled an economy in which syndication among experienced and even
with inexperienced investors may be advantageous. On one hand, the
active participation of experienced investors, who contribute to the
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project’s success with their knowledge and expertise, increases the ex-
pected project value. On the other hand, young financiers may gather
valuable know-how for future deals when they invest in a project to-
gether with skilled partners. Whereas the vast majority of existing
literature on syndication deals with the analysis of gains and costs
in a static setting, we have considered a dynamic environment which
enables the transfer of knowledge to take place and in which repu-
tational aspects play a central role. Our model leads to the follow-
ing empirically testable implication: In a syndicate, financiers with
different reputations accordingly receive different financing contracts.
Furthermore, the contracts for a certain financier should change (be
less “unfair” to him) with time, as he gains experience and builds his
reputation.
Reputational aspects mitigate incentives for a hold-up. The transfer
of know-how and skills precipitates the learning processes that may be
decisive for the diffusion of new financing instruments in an economy.
This fact is notably important mainly for those market segments that
are in the early stages of their development and where many inex-
perienced investors can be found. The recent rapid development of
venture capital and private equity markets in continental Europe can
serve as an example. Here, young inexperienced domestic venture cap-
ital and private equity funds have often formed syndicates with skilled
financiers from abroad (mainly the United States or the United King-
dom). They have profited from these deals by gaining helpful skills
and good reputation, which have contributed to the further develop-
ment of these markets in Europe. This paper has demonstrated why
such heterogenous syndicate structures emerge and has shown under
which circumstances experienced investors are interested in these kind
of deals.
Factors that facilitate syndication include deep interest rates, a high
efficiency of the investors’ effort and low effort costs. According to
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our model, for a chance to participate in a syndicate, unskilled fi-
nanciers have to accept worse financing conditions than experienced
ones. Thus, particularly in a young market with inexperienced in-
vestors, securities design plays a central role. In order to support the
diffusion of new financing instruments and knowledge transfer, the
institutional setting must allow the implementation of such securi-
ties, which enable an overproportional involvement of inexperienced
financiers on investment costs.
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Appendix
A Type E in the First Period and No
Syndication in the Second
The solution to the maximization problem in (10) is derived below.
PC1 implies firstly that 0 ≤ λλ+ϕ ≤ α and secondly that IC1 holds
because from PC1 and (6), we get
c ≤ λ
λ+ ϕ
ϕ ≤ αϕ .
After a few rearrangements of the inequality c ≤ αϕ (subtracting c
from and adding αλ to both sides) we obtain the condition IC1.
Furthermore, PC2 holds if IC2 is met and 1 − α is non-negative. If
H2 is met, then (after a few rearrangements of H2)
α ≤ ϕ+
1
1+r(λ− c)
λ+ ϕ
=
ϕ+ 11+rλ
λ+ ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
−
1
1+rc
λ+ ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 1 .
In other words, in order to prevent a hold-up by the syndication part-
ner, his share of the expected revenue 1 − α must be positive. Thus,
H2 and IC2 imply PC2.
Furthermore, following the argumentation above, if H2 and PC1 both
hold then α ² 〈0, 1〉 is satisfied. Thus, in the maximization problem
(10), three constraints (IC2, H2 and PC1) remain. When all of them
hold, the other three are also met.
When maximizing α under both incentive constraints of the syndica-
tion partner (IC2 and H2), we obtain
α = min{ϕ+
1
1+r(λ− c)
λ+ ϕ
,
ϕ− c
ϕ
} .
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Thus, α =
ϕ+ 11+r (λ−c)
λ+ϕ if
ϕ+ 11+r (λ−c)
λ+ϕ <
ϕ−c
ϕ . After a few rearrangements
of this inequality, we get
λϕ− cϕ < (1 + r)(λϕ− cλ− cϕ)
cλ
λϕ− c(λ+ ϕ) < r
Otherwise, α = ϕ−cϕ .
Furthermore, the participation constraint of the original investor (PC1)
must be satisfied for these two values of α. This implies that ϕ +
1
1+r(λ − c) ≥ λ when α =
ϕ+ 11+r (λ−c)
λ+ϕ and c ≤ ϕ
2
λ+ϕ when α =
ϕ−c
ϕ . If
the original investor’s participation constraint holds and he syndicates
with type E, his expected profit in the first period amounts to
pi = α(ϕ+ λ) = min{ϕ+ 1
1 + r
(λ− c)− c, ϕ− c
ϕ
(λ+ ϕ)− c} .
B Type N in the First Period and No
Syndication in the Second
The solution to the maximization problem in (11) is derived below.
Since ϕ < λ, H2 implies PC2. Thus, H2 is binding. Therefore, we
have
α =
1
1+r(λ− c)− βI + ϕ
λ
. (14)
We substitute this value into the remaining four constraints.
(a) ϕ+ 11+r(λ− c)− λ ≥ 0 : PC1
(b) β ≤ −c(
1
1+rϕ+λ)+ϕ(ϕ+
1
1+rλ)
ϕI : IC1
(c) β ≤
1
1+r (λ−c)+ϕ
I+λ : α− β ≥ 0
The latter condition and (14) jointly imply that α ≥ 0.
(d) β ≥
1
1+r (λ−c)+ϕ−λ
I : α ≤ 1
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The latter and the first condition jointly imply that β ≥ 0 and, thus,
α− β ≤ 1.
If these four conditions are met and α is given by (14), all constraints
indicated in the maximization problem (11) are satisfied.
It can be shown that it is possible to find at least one β that satisfies
all three constraints concerning this parameter ((b), (c) and (d)).
Firstly, we show that (c) and (d) do not contradict. Hence, our aim
is to prove that
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ− λ
I
≤ β ≤
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ
I + λ
.
Pursuant to (7), 11+r(λ− c) + ϕ ≤ I + λ. After a few rearrangements,
we get the desired inequality.
(
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ)λ ≤ λ(I + λ)
(
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ)(I + λ)− λ(I + λ) ≤ ( 1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ)I
(
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− λ)(I + λ) ≤ ( 1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ)I
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ− λ
I
≤
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ
I + λ
.
Secondly, we show that (b) and (d) do not contradict. We prove that
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ− λ
I
≤ β ≤ −c(
1
1+rϕ+ λ) + ϕ(ϕ+
1
1+rλ)
ϕI
.
Pursuant to (6), c ≤ ϕ. After several steps, we obtain the inequality
indicated above.
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−ϕλ ≤ −cλ
−ϕλ+ 1
1 + r
λϕ− 1
1 + r
cϕ+ ϕ2 ≤ −cλ+ 1
1 + r
λϕ− 1
1 + r
cϕ+ ϕ2
ϕ(
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− λ) ≤ −c(λ+ 1
1 + r
ϕ) + ϕ(
1
1 + r
λ+ ϕ)
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− λ ≤ −c(
1
1+rϕ+ λ) + ϕ(ϕ+
1
1+rλ)
ϕ
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ− λ
I
≤ −c(
1
1+rϕ+ λ) + ϕ(ϕ+
1
1+rλ)
ϕI
.
So, if (d) is fulfilled with equality, both (b) and (c) hold. Thus, β has
at least one solution that satisfies all three conditions (b), (c) and (d),
namely
β =
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ− λ
I
.
The value of α is given by (14). Thus, one of the possible solutions to
the optimization problem in (11) is (if PC1 is satisfied)
{α, β} =
{
1,
1
1+r(λ− c) + ϕ− c
I
}
. (15)
In this case, type E receives all of the revenue from the project, but
finances only a part of investment I. Other solutions may exist where
α is lower (β higher) than in (15) and the expected profits remain
unchanged.
In contrast to the final period where syndication with type N cannot
take place, the dynamic aspect makes such agreements possible in the
first period (when PC1 is satisfied). Whether or not PC1 holds, only
depends on the parameters of the model and not on the values of α
and β (see condition (a)).
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When PC1 is satisfied, then the expected profit of the experienced
investor in the first period amounts to (after substituting (14) in (11))
pi =
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− c .
When PC1 is not satisfied, type E prefers investing alone rather than
syndicating with type N in the first period.
C Type E in the First Period and Syn-
dication in the Second
The solution to the maximization problem in (12) is derived below.
We proceed analogously to Appendix A, where the solution to the
maximization problem in (10) has been shown.
If IC2 holds then α is lower than 1 and PC2 is met. PC1 implies
that α ≥ 0 and, because of (6), that IC1 also holds. Thus, the more
restrictive of the two incentive constraints of the syndication partner
(IC2 or H2) is binding. We get
α = min{ϕ+
1
1+r(ϕ− c)
ϕ+ λ
,
ϕ− c
ϕ
} .
If
ϕ+ 11+r (ϕ−c)
ϕ+λ <
ϕ−c
ϕ , then α =
ϕ+ 11+r (ϕ−c)
ϕ+λ . After a few rearrangements
of this inequality, we obtain
ϕ2 +
1
1 + r
ϕ(ϕ− c) < ϕ2 − cϕ+ λϕ− cλ
1
1 + r
<
ϕλ− c(ϕ+ λ)
ϕ2 − cϕ
r >
ϕ2 − cϕ− ϕλ+ cϕ+ cλ
ϕλ− c(ϕ+ λ)
r >
ϕ2 − ϕλ+ cλ
ϕλ− c(ϕ+ λ)
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We show that the participation constraint of the first investor (PC1),
i.e. α ≥ λϕ+λ , is satisfied for both values of α.
(a) If α =
ϕ+ 11+r (ϕ−c)
ϕ+λ then α ≥ λϕ+λ because
ϕ ≥ λ
ϕ+
1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) ≥ λ
α =
ϕ+ 11+r(ϕ− c)
ϕ+ λ
≥ λ
ϕ+ λ
.
(b) If α = ϕ−cϕ then α ≥ λϕ+λ because, pursuant to (6) and ϕ ≥ λ, c ≤
ϕ2
ϕ+λ . We rearrange the last inequality to get the desired relationship.
In the first step, we multiply both sides of the inequality with (ϕ+λ)
and add (−cϕ− cλ+ ϕλ).
ϕ2 − cϕ− cλ+ ϕλ ≥ ϕλ
(ϕ− c)(λ+ ϕ) ≥ ϕλ
α =
ϕ− c
ϕ
≥ λ
λ+ ϕ
.
The expected profit of the experienced investor in the first period
reaches
pi = min{2 + r
1 + r
(ϕ− c), ϕ− c
ϕ
(λ+ ϕ)− c} .
D Type N in the First Period and Syn-
dication in the Second
The solution to the maximization problem in (13) is derived below.
We proceed analogously to Appendix B, where the solution to the
maximization problem in (11) has been shown. Since λ− ϕ ≤ 0, PC2
implies H2. Thus, PC2 is binding. We get
α =
1
1+r(ϕ− c)− βI + λ
λ
. (16)
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We show that for this α, PC1 is satisfied. PC1 indicates that α ≥ λ−βIλ .
Thus, we must show that
1
1+r(ϕ− c)− βI + λ
λ
≥ λ− βI
λ
.
After a few rearrangements we obtain
1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) ≥ 0 , which is true.
Furthermore, if the three conditions listed below are met, all remaining
constraints of the maximization problem (13) are fulfilled as well.
(a) β ≤ (ϕ−c)(
1
1+rϕ+λ)
ϕI : IC1
(b) β ≤
1
1+r (ϕ−c)+λ
I+λ : α− β ≥ 0
The latter condition and (16) jointly imply that α ≥ 0.
(c) β ≥
1
1+r (ϕ−c)
I : α ≤ 1.
The latter condition and (16) jointly imply that α− β ≤ 1.
Firstly, we show that (b) and (c) do not contradict. Hence, our aim
is to prove that
1
1+r(ϕ− c)
I
≤
1
1+r(ϕ− c) + λ
I + λ
.
Since r ≥ 0, we know that
ϕ− λ ≥ 1
1 + r
(ϕ− λ) .
After rearranging, we obtain
ϕ− λ ≥ 1
1 + r
ϕ− 1
1 + r
λ− 1
1 + r
c+
1
1 + r
c
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− λ ≥ 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) .
Pursuant to (7)
1
1 + r
(λ− c) + ϕ− λ ≤ I .
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Combining the last two inequalities, we get
I ≥ 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c)
Iλ ≥ 1
1 + r
λ(ϕ− c)
Iλ+
1
1 + r
(ϕ− c)I ≥ 1
1 + r
λ(ϕ− c) + 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c)I
1
1+r(ϕ− c) + λ
I + λ
≥
1
1+r(ϕ− c)
I
.
Secondly, we can easily show that (a) and (c) do not contradict
1
1 + r
ϕ ≤ 1
1 + r
ϕ+ λ
1
1+rϕ(ϕ− c)
I
≤ (
1
1+rϕ+ λ)(ϕ− c)
I
1
1+r(ϕ− c)
I
≤ (
1
1+rϕ+ λ)(ϕ− c)
ϕI
.
Thus, β has at least one solution
β =
1
1+r(ϕ− c)
I
.
This β leads to α = 1.
For all βs that fulfill the constraints given above, the expected profit
of type E in the first period amounts to (after substituting (16) in
(13))
pi =
1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) + λ− c .
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E The Decision in the First Period if Syn-
dication in the Second
Case 1: Firstly, we show that the expected profit from syndication with
type E is no lower than that from investing alone, i.e. 2+r1+r(ϕ − c) ≥
λ− c. From λ ≤ ϕ (and r > 0, ϕ > 0, λ > 0) immediately follows
2 + r
1 + r
(ϕ− c) = ϕ− c+ 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) > λ− c .
Secondly, we demonstrate that the expected profit from syndication
with type E is no lower than that from syndication with type N, i.e.
2+r
1+r(ϕ− c) ≥ 11+r(ϕ− c) + λ− c. With λ ≤ ϕ, we have
2 + r
1 + r
(ϕ− c) = ϕ− c+ 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) ≥ 1
1 + r
(ϕ− c) + λ− c .
Case 2: Firstly, we show that the expected profit from syndication with
type E is no lower than that from investing alone, i.e. (ϕ−c)(λ+ϕ)ϕ − c ≥
λ − c. With (6) and λ ≤ ϕ, we get c ≤ ϕ2ϕ+λ . After rearranging, we
obtain the desired inequality.
c ≤ ϕ
2
ϕ+ λ
λϕ ≤ ϕ2 − cϕ− cλ+ λϕ
λ ≤ (ϕ− c)(λ+ ϕ)
ϕ
.
Secondly, we demonstrate that the decision between syndication with
type N and syndication with type E depends on the interest rate
r. Syndication with type E is better for the original investor than
syndication with type N if (ϕ−c)(λ+ϕ)ϕ − c > λ + 11+r(ϕ− c)− c. From
this inequality, we obtain the following condition for r :
1
1 + r
< 1− cλ
ϕ(ϕ− c) .
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